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The Alphabetic Mind:
A Gift of Greece to the Modern World
Eric A. Havelock
Up until about 700 years before Christ the Greek peoples were non-literate. 
About that time they invented a writing system conveniently described as an 
“alphabet,” the Greek word for it. The use of this invention in the course of 300 to 
400 years after 700 B.C. had a transformational effect upon the behavior of the Greek 
language, upon the kind of things that could be said in the language and the things 
that could be thought as it was used. The transformation, however, did not substitute 
one language for another. The Greek of the Hellenistic age is recognizably close 
kin to the Greek of Homer. Yet the degree of transformation can be conveniently 
measured by comparing Homer at the upper end of the time-span with the language 
of Aristotle at the lower end. The earlier form came into existence as an instrument 
for the preservation of oral speech through memorization. This memorized form 
was not the vernacular of casual conversation but an artifi cially managed language 
with special rules for memorization, one of which was rhythm. The later form, the 
Aristotelean one, existed and still exists as a literate instrument designed primarily 
for readers. It preserves its content not through memorization but by placing it in 
a visual artifact, the alphabet, where
,
 the content can survive as long as the artifact 
and its copies survive also. The transformational effect made itself felt slowly in 
the course of 350 years. It was a complex process. What precisely was its nature? 
Its complexity can be summed up variously as on the one hand, a shift from poetry 
to prose as the medium of preserved communication; or again as a shift in literary 
style from narrative towards exposition; or again as the creation of a new literate 
syntax of defi nition which could be superimposed upon the oral
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syntax that described action. Or again we discern the invention of a conceptual 
language superimposed upon a non-conceptual; or alternatively a creation of the 
abstract to replace the concrete, the invention of an abstract version of what had 
previously been experienced sensually and directly as a series of events or actions.
If one uses such terms as “concept” or “abstraction” to indicate the end result 
of the transformation, one has to clear up some basic confusions in the use of these 
terms. Critics and commentators are fond of calling attention to the presence of 
what they call abstractions or abstract ideas in Homer. This at bottom is a mistake, 
the nature of which can be clarifi ed by giving an example of what the abstractive 
process in language involves, as opposed to Homeric idiom.
The poet Homer begins his Iliad by addressing his Muse: “Sing I pray 
you the wrath of Achilles, the wrath that ravages, the wrath that placed on the 
Achaeans ten thousand affl ictions.” Suppose we render these sentiments into prose 
and translate them into abstract terms; they would then run somewhat as follows: 
“My poem’s subject is the wrath of Achilles which had disruptive effects and these 
caused deep distress for the Achaeans.” A series of acts signalled in the original by 
appropriate transitive verbs and performed by agents on personal objects is replaced 
by abstractions connected to each other by verbs indicating fi xed relationships 
between them. Instead of a “me” actually speaking to another person, i.e., the Muse, 
who in turn has to perform the act of singing aloud, we get “my subject is so and 
so;” an “is” statement with an abstract subject has replaced two persons connected 
by an action. Instead of the image of wrath acting like a ravaging army, we get 
the “effect” created by this instrument; instead of a bundle of woes being placed 
like a weight on human shoulders, we get a single impersonal abstraction— “deep 
distress” —connected to a previous abstraction— “disruptive effects”—by a causal 
relationship—“these caused.”
In a pre-alphabetic society like that of Homer, only the fi rst of these two 
alternative modes of describing the same phenomenon was available. Why this 
was so I will explain later. A literate critic, that is a “literary” critic, analyzing the 
substance of the story will use terms of the second mode in order to understand the 
language of the fi rst. Too often all he manages to do is to introduce misunderstanding. 
He undercuts the active, transitive, and dynamic syntax of the original which is 
typical of all speech in
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societies of oral communication and particularly of preserved speech in such 
societies.
 The second mode, which I will call the conceptual as well as the alphabetic, 
had to be invented, and it was the invention of literacy. Such a statement as “my 
subject is the wrath” would in orality represent something to be avoided. As a type 
it represents the kind of analytic discourse which does not meet the requirement of 
easy and continuous memorization.
 I call your attention in particular to the formal announcement: “my subject 
is the wrath.” The clue to the creation of a conceptual discourse replacing the poetic 
one lies in the monosyllable “is.” Here is the copula as we call it, the commonest 
version now of the verb “to be” familiar in daily converse, let alone refl ective 
speech, connecting two conceptual words, “subject” and “wrath.” “Wrath” is linked 
to “subject” as its equivalent, but also as an alternative defi nition of what this subject 
“is.” To give a simpler and even more commonplace example: when in modern 
speech A remarks to B “your house is beautiful,” the copula assigns a property to 
an object which is not abstract but which by the copula usage is attached to the 
“attribute” beauty (or in the new practice of analytic discourse it is “implicated”). 
In ancient Greek as it was spoken down to Plato’s day, the “is” would be omitted.
 These illustrations bring out a fundamental fact about the language of the 
conceptual mind: clues to its nature are not to be found by isolating mere nouns as 
such and classifying them as abstract or concrete. It is the syntax in which they are 
embedded that betrays the difference. The word “wrath” could if you so choose be 
viewed as a kind of abstraction, a psychological one. But it is not a true abstraction 
because it is an agent which performs, in the course of three lines (only two of 
which I have quoted), no less than four perfectly concrete actions: it ravages; it 
picks up a burden and puts it on the shoulders of the Greeks; it catapults human lives 
into Hades; it converts men into things for animals to eat.
 Complete “conceptuality” of discourse (if this be the appropriate word) 
depends not on single words treated as phenomena per se, but on their being placed 
in a given relationship to one another in statements which employ either a copula or 
an equivalent to connect them. The growth of abstractionism and conceptualism in 
the Greek tongue is not 
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discoverable by a mere resort to lexicons, indexes, and glossaries, common as this 
practice has become. Single words classifi able as abstract like “justice” or “strife” 
or “war” or “peace” can as easily be personifi ed as not. What is in question is the 
ability of the human mind to create and manipulate theoretic statements as opposed 
to particular ones; to replace a performative syntax by a logical one.
 Homeric and oral discourse often resorts to a personifi cation of what the 
literate critic is tempted to call abstractions. But considered as abstractions they 
fail the syntactical test; they are always busy, performing or behaving. They are not 
allowed to be identifi ed categorically as terms under which the action is arranged 
and classifi ed. They are never defi ned or described analytically; they are innocent 
of any connection with the copula which can link them to a defi nition, give them an 
attribute, link them to a class or kind. They never appear in what I shall call the “is 
statement.”
 Let us revert again to Homer’s preface to his Iliad. The story is ignited so 
to speak by a quarrel between Achilles and his commander-in-chief. The poet asks 
rhetorically “and pray then which one of the gods combined these two together 
in contentious strife to fi ght?” The Homeric name for this kind of strife is eris. 
Later in the narrative it acquires a capital letter (to use an anachronism). It becomes 
“personifi ed,” as we say, as a kind of feminine principle, though again the term 
“principle” is wholly anachronistic. “Her” behavior is evoked in a rich variety of 
imagery: “she” can be discovered “raging ceaselessly, a little wave which then 
extends from earth to heaven, throwing contested feud into the throng, enlarging 
agony”; or again “painfully severe (a missile) discharged by Zeus, emplacing might 
and strength in the heart”; or again “bewept and bewailed”; or again “keeping 
company with battle noise and ravaging fate”; or again “arising in force, rousing 
peoples to rage, as the gods mingled in battle.” Nowhere is the term given either 
social or psychological defi nition: we are told what “she” does, we are never told 
what “it” is.
 A modern poet or writer of fi ction might choose imagery for his subject 
which allowed equal freedom. But behind his imagery in the language of his culture 
there lurks in parallel an alternative type of language which could be chosen to 
defi ne or describe analytically what he is talking about. In oral cultures, for reasons 
to be explained later, no such language is available.
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 In dealing with the history of human civilizations, the terms “Western” and 
“European” are used loosely to draw a defi nition of culture based on geography. 
The counter-cultures are those of Arabia, India, China, or sometimes the “Near 
East” and the “Far East.” The geographic distinction is supported by drawing a 
parallel religious one, which refers to the differences between a Judaeo-Christian 
faith on the one hand and Islam or Buddhism or Confucianism on the other. These 
stereotypes are in common use. The classifi cation I am proposing, one which has 
more operational meaning, is that between the alphabetic cultures and the non-
alphabetic ones, with the qualifi cation that in the present crisis of modernity, with 
technological man increasingly dominant over traditional man, the alphabetic 
culture shows increasing signs of invading the nonalphabetic ones and taking them 
over. That is to say, written communication world-wide, as it is used to preserve and 
re-use information, is tending increasingly to be alphabetized. This can be viewed 
as an effect of the superior military and industrial power wielded by the alphabetic 
cultures. But I would argue that this power itself, as it originally emerged very slowly 
in antiquity, and as it has gained rapid momentum since the end of the eighteenth 
century of our era, is itself an alphabetic phenomenon. Power has been derived 
from the mechanisms of written communication. Communication is not merely the 
instrument of thought; it also creates thought. Alphabetic communication, which 
meant literate communication, brought into existence the kind of thinking which 
remodels the dynamic fl ow of daily experience into “is statements,” of one sort or 
another. This permits a conceptual analysis of what happens in the environment and 
in ourselves and creates the power not merely to reason about what happens but to 
control it and to change what happens. This power is not available in oral cultures.
 Those familiar with the history of the alphabet will be aware that by alphabetic 
cultures I mean those that use either the original Greek form, or its common Roman 
adaptation which I am using at the moment, or its Cyrillic version as used by the 
Russian state and some other peoples.
 I throw out another suggestion, merely as an aside to my present argument, 
that one of the causes of the profound unease that exists between the Soviets and 
the “West,” to use the convenient term, is not merely the result of competing social 
systems. It has some seat in the unlucky accident that the
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Russian Cyrillic script seems somehow alien to western habit; it constitutes an extra 
barrier to be surmounted on top of the formidable one created by language. The 
barrier is of this peculiar sort that a script is something you can see, an object, not 
simply a noise heard like language. Man even today does not live merely in a tower 
of linguistic Babel, he lives also in a Babel of competing scripts. This competition 
and collision is an unnoticed element in the evolution of modern societies. Here is a 
theme which I predict will have to be taken up one day by historians of culture.
 Support for some rather sweeping affi rmations as I have made them lies 
originally in the Greek story. It was in ancient Greece that it all started. The alphabetic 
mind is the Greek mind as it in time became, but not as it originally was. Greece 
created it, but Greece also preserved the oralist mind. The history of Greek culture 
is the history of the confrontation of these two minds, or more accurately their 
creative partnership as it developed over three and one-half centuries to the point of 
their amalgamation—something which has endured in the alphabetic cultures that 
inherited the Greek invention.
 In the Greek case, the intrusion of conceptual language and thought into 
oral language and thought and the replacement of one by the other can most easily 
be measured as it occurs in the changing Greek descriptions of human behavior, 
particularly what we style “moral” behavior. Moral philosophy, as understood in the 
West and as usually taught in the classroom under the rubric of ethics, is a creation 
of alphabetic literacy which came into existence in the last half of the fi fth and the 
fi rst half of the fourth centuries B.C. in the city of Athens.
 By the term “moral philosophy” I intend to indicate any system of discourse, 
and by extension of thought, in which the terms right and wrong or good and bad 
are assumed from a logical standpoint to be not only formally speaking antithetical 
but mutually exclusive of each other and from a referential standpoint to defi ne all 
human behavior as divided exhaustively into two categories, right and good and 
wrong and bad. Thus positioned in human discourse the terms right and wrong, 
good and bad supply norms by which to classify what is done or thought as right or 
wrong, good or bad.
 In popular speech these terms are frequently reinforced by substituting the 
words “moral” and “immoral.” It is assumed that these denote universals which can 
be used unambiguously to guide
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choices we have to make as between the two types of action. They provide foundations 
for moral judgments which theoretically are fi nal. Different linguistic formulas 
have been employed to designate the overall nature of the right or the good; one 
thinks of the moral imperative of Kant or the intuited indefi nable goodness of G. E. 
Moore or a theory of justice as proposed by John Rawls. But always the existence 
of such a norm in the full formal sense of the term is assumed as fundamental 
to the human condition. What I am proposing here is that the mental process we 
identify as forming a moral judgment has not always been a necessary component 
of the human condition but had its a historical origin in late fi fth-century Athens. 
Its effectiveness depended upon a prior ability of the human mind to conceptualize 
the rules of behavior as moral universals, an ability which emerged only as the oral 
culture of Greece yielded to an alphabetic one.
 To test this assertion let us turn to the earliest extant discussion in Greek 
of the term “justice.” This occurs in a poem composed soon after Homer’s day but 
long before Plato, namely, the Works and Days attributed to Hesiod. The style of 
composition reveals the beginning of a transition from a poetry of listeners towards 
a poetry which might be read—but only the beginning. One of the component 
parts—the whole poem runs to over 800 lines—is a discourse of less than 100 lines, 
a poem within a poem, which possesses an identity of its own, addressing itself 
as it does with considerable concentration to the single Greek term dikê which we 
normally translate as “justice.” Let us observe the syntax in which this term of 
moral “reference,” as we normally think of it, is employed. My translation, which 
selects those statements where the syntax emerges, will hew as close as possible to 
the sense of the archaic original (Works and Days, 214 ff.):
O Perses, I pray you: hearken to (the voice of)
justice nor magnify outrage . . . justice over
outrage prevails having gotten through to the
goal. Even a fool learns from experience; for
look! Oath is running alongside crooked
justices. Uproar of justice being dragged
away where men take her—. . . she follows
on weeping to city and dwelling places of
people clothed in mist carrying evil to man-
kind, such as drive her out and they have not
meted her straight.
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They who to stranger-guests and demos-dwellers
give justices (that are) straight and do not 
step across out of justice at all—for them 
the city fl ourishes merry and the people in it 
blossom . . . nor ever among men of straight 
justice does famine keep company . . .
O lords I pray you: Do you, even you, consider 
deeply this justice. Near at hand, among mankind 
being-present, the immortals consider all who with 
crooked justices infl ict attrition on each other 
regarding not the awful word of gods. Present 
are thrice ten thousand upon the much-nourishing 
earth, immortal guards of Zeus, of mortal men, 
who keep guard over justices and ruthless works clothed 
in mist going to and fro all over the earth. 
Present is maiden justice, of Zeus the offspring 
born, both renowned and revered of the gods who 
tenant Olympus, and should one at any time disable 
her, crookedly castigating, straightway sitting 
beside father Zeus the Kronian she sings the 
non-just intention of men till it pay back . . . 
The eye of Zeus having seen all and noted all 
intently, even these (things) should he so wish 
he is looking at nor is (it) hidden from him 
what kind of justice indeed (is) this (that) a city 
confi nes “inside . . .
O Perses I pray you: cast these up in your thoughts: 
hearken to (the voice of) justice and let violence 
be hidden from your sight. This usage for mankind 
the Kronian has severally ordained, for fi sh and 
beasts and winged fowl to eat each other since
justice is not present among them, but to mankind 
he gave justice which most excellent by far comes-to-be.
 Granted that these statements focus upon a term which in our alphabetic 
society has become central to moral philosophy, what do we learn from them about 
its nature? Surely the account of it is from a modern standpoint anomalous. What 
is one to make of a discussion which can make free, both with a “justice” in the 
singular, which we might try and squeeze into the guise of a “conception” of justice, 
and with “justices” in the plural, intermingling and interchanging them without 
apology, as though
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the “concept” on the one hand, if we can call it that, and the specifi c applications of 
the concept on the other, if that is what they are, were indistinguishable? Worse still; 
what can we make of a term which at one time symbolizes what is straight and good 
and at another can symbolize what is crooked and obviously “wrong”?
 The problem receives some illumination when we notice that whether in 
the singular or plural this word symbolizes something which is spoken aloud, 
pronounced, proclaimed, declared or else listened to, heard, and remembered. 
Personifi ed it can scream or sing, and become the recipient of verbal abuse, and 
is disabled by oral testimony which is false. In this guise it becomes a procedure 
conducted in oral exchange. The constant imputation of crookedness probably 
refers to crookedness of speech (rather than unfair manipulation of boundary lines 
in property, as has been suggested).
 In short this is that kind of justice practiced in an oral society not defi ned 
by written codes. But having got this far, any further attempt to defi ne what justice 
really is fails us. “She” or “it” or “they” are Protean in the shapes they take and in 
the actions performed. “She” becomes a runner in a race and is then reintroduced as 
a girl dragged along in distress; and then becomes a girl now travelling to town in 
disguise before being thrown out. When transferred to Olympus, the scene reveals 
a personal justice complaining to Zeus that men are unjust, apparently to get him 
to intervene. “She” is then replaced by Zeus himself looking down on a justice 
confi ned inside a city until at last in the conclusion, “she” is given some universal 
color by being described as a gift assigned to mankind by Zeus.
 Let us recall the Homeric behavior of that personifi cation styled eris, the 
symbol of contentious strife behaving in a similar variety of confi gurations. Here is 
no “concept” or “principle” of justice, no analytic defi nition, no attempt to tell us 
what justice is. Such a statement is still beyond the poet’s capacity, even though his 
assemblage of instances and examples marks an attempt to mobilize the word as a 
topic, a chapter heading, a theme. In going this far, the poet is composing visually as 
a reader for readers. He is trying to break with the narrative context, the storytelling 
that oral composition has required, but which his written word does not require. 
But his break is only partial. His justice is still something that acts or behaves or 
becomes, not
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something that “is.” The language of refl ective philosophy, let alone moral 
philosophy, is not yet available.
 It was becoming available perhaps two centuries later, and a little later still 
can be observed at work in the written word as it is composed by Plato. Here is a 
documented discourse which no longer needs to be phrased in specifi cs or in images. 
It can be, of course, if the composer so chooses, but it can tolerate in increasing 
quantity something that orally preserved speech cannot, namely, statements of “fact” 
or statements of “universals,” statements of “principles” rather than descriptions of 
“events.” That is, it can state that something always “is so and so” rather than that 
something “was done” or “occurred” or “was in place.” In Platonism these linguistic 
objectives have been achieved. They are woven into the syntax of argument, 
appearing there casually without exciting attention from a literate readership which 
is used to using them in its own discourse. Here, for example, is how the term 
“justice,” after being created as a topic by Hesiod, makes its fi rst appearance in the 
Platonic text which deals with it demonstratively, namely, Plato’s Republic (I. 331 
C):
Now take precisely this (thing) namely justice: 
Are we to say that it is truthfulness absolutely 
speaking and giving back anything one has taken 
from somebody else or are these very (things) to 
be done sometimes justly and at other times 
unjustly?
This sentence, occurring near the beginning of the fi rst book of the treatise, introduces 
the concept with which the remaining books are to deal. The syntax which identifi es 
justice as truthfulness meets a complex requirement. First, the subject is non-
personal. Second, it receives a predicate which is non-personal. Third, the linking 
verb becomes the copula “is.” In the alternative defi nition that is then posed, the 
same verb “to be” is used to connect a neuter pronoun with a predicate infi nitive, 
an abstraction. These are characteristics of Plato’s argumentative text which we 
normally take for granted.
 To cite another example, which is more professionally stated with profuse 
use of the neuter singular to express abstraction (Euthyphro, 5 C-D):
So now I implore tell me that which you 
insisted just now you thoroughly knew:
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What kind (of thing) do you say the pious is,
and the impious, in the case of manslaughter
and so on; surely the holy in all action is
identical itself with itself; whereas the
unholy is completely the opposite of the holy,
something always resembling itself having one
specifi c shape completely in accordance with
unholiness, whatever the unholy turns out to be.
This passage makes plain the kind of syntax now available and necessary for didactic 
argument and the particular reliance of the Platonic method upon this syntax: the 
subjects have to be impersonals, the verbs must take copulative form, and the 
predicates have to be impersonals.
 It is convenient to identify Plato as the discoverer of the necessity of this 
syntax in its completed form and therefore as the writer who completed the process 
of linguistic emancipation from the syntax of oral storage. For good measure it is 
possible to cite some less perfect examples from thinkers who preceded him, from 
both the pre-Socratic philosophers and the “sophists” as they are usually styled. The 
language of the fi fth century as it was employed by intellectuals exhibits a gradual 
acceleration of the abstractive process.
 It is equally to the point to notice that Plato’s relationship to orality is still 
intermediate. He can use language that hovers between oral and literate discourse, 
that is, between the syntax of narrative and the syntax of defi nition. Thus, as Plato 
approaches the task of defi ning justice in its political dimension, he indulges himself 
in a passage like the following (Republic IV. 432 B-D):
The time has come for us to behave like huntsmen
encircling a thicket concentrating on preventing
justice from slipping through and disappearing.
Evidently it is present somewhere around here.
So keep looking, be ready to catch sight of it,
and if you happen to sight it before I do point
it out to me—I wish I could, but you will make
quite adequate use of me if, instead, you use me
as a follower who can look at what is shown to
him—Then follow and let us both pray for luck.
I will; you just go ahead—Well here we are;
this place by the look of it is hard to get
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through; it is cut off from the light, it presents
itself dark in fact and scarcely to be
tracked through. However let’s go in—yes 
let’s go—whereupon I caught sight of some-
thing and shouted: Glaucon, we probably are onto 
a track; I don’t think (the object) will quite 
succeed in getting away—That’s good news!
The quarry sought is justice, but this kind of dramatic interchange is going to lead 
up to a quite different type of discourse in which it will be proposed what justice 
really is, namely “doing one’s own thing.” It will lead up to an argument which 
is analytic and conceptual. Yet one observes the continued effort to conciliate the 
reader who is still close to his oral inheritance. By letting the discourse relapse into 
a syntax which narrates the activities of living subjects and objects we are invited to 
join a hunt in a forest for a quarry. Will it slip through the thicket? No, the hunters 
have spotted it. This is “Homeric,” not philosophic, prose.
 By way of contrast to this intermediate style of discourse occasionally adopted 
by Plato—intermediate between oralism and literacy, between the pre-conceptual 
and the conceptual—I quote a passage taken at random from the beginning of David 
Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature:
I perceive therefore that though there is in general a great resemblance betwixt our 
complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not universally true, that they are 
exact copies of each other. We may next consider, how the case stands with our 
simple perceptions. After the most accurate examination of which I am capable, 
I venture to affi rm, that the rule here holds without any exceptions, and that 
every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and every simple 
impression a correspondent idea.1
 The Platonic passage expresses awareness that the act of conceptualizing 
justice and defi ning it axiomatically in entirely abstract terms requires from his 
reader an extraordinary effort, a new order of thinking, an order of intellection. To 
reach to this order, the passage reverts to the simpler language of orality: huntsmen 
are closing in on their quarry hidden in a thicket, ready to catch sight of it and so 
forth. Hume’s exposition prefers to present statements as the result of perception, 
consideration,
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examination, affi rmation. Over the 2,000 years since Plato wrote, these terms 
have become commonplaces of description of intellectual processes which are 
analytical, the purpose of which is to construct statements which are either analytic 
or synthetic.
 The predicates in Plato’s text do not describe fi xed relationships between 
entities, but describe linkages which are achieved through action as it is performed: 
encircling, slipping through, “we have to get through,” “we are cut off,” “this is 
hard to be tracked,” “it will get away.” The corresponding linkages in Hume’s text 
are conveyed in statements of being, that is, of relationships which are permanent, 
and therefore require the copula in order to be described. “There is in general; the 
rule is not universally true; they are exact; how the case stands; the rule here holds; 
every simple idea has a simple impression.” These are expressed in the present 
tense—the timeless present and not the “historic” present—such “tenses” are not 
really tenses at all. They do not refer to a present moment of a narrated experience 
now recalled as distinct from other moments. The verb “is” shares with the verbs 
“hold” and “have” the predicative function of presenting a “state of the case” as 
determinate fact, not as a fl eeting moment of action or response.
 This is the language which Plato himself strives after through all his written 
works. It had to be fought for with all the strenuousness of the dialectic which he 
inherited from Socrates. The need he still feels to conciliate his oralist reader by 
reviving the epic oral syntax would not occur to Hume, still less to Kant or any 
modern moralist.
 Hume’s discourse is that of a professional philosopher and most of us are 
not philosophers. We normally avoid involving ourselves in discussion of such 
abstract problems. But we can drop casually into Hume’s kind of language, in 
personal converse. Conspicuous and noticeable examples are furnished today in 
the vocabularies of the bureaucracies that manage our affairs for us; not least the 
military ones. Names of actions which are specifi c and concrete, and which would 
be described as such in oral language, are perversely translated into abstractions; to 
kill a group of villagers becomes a liquidation of opposition, to demand more tax 
money becomes “enhancement of revenue resources.” There now exists a whole 
level of language which is basically theoretic, and it did not become possible until 
after language became alphabetical.
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 Side by side with it, in much of our daily life, we drop back into the concrete 
realistic dynamism of oral converse, as we prepare to eat breakfast or get the children 
off to school or mix a drink after a tiring day, and most of all when we make love 
or quarrel or fi ght. There is a basic honesty inherent in the oral medium—Homeric 
honesty that calls a spade a spade—which is transcended in the conceptual version 
and converted into a linguistic medium which often requires a degree of hypocrisy. 
It creates a distance between the oral language which simply registers and the 
language which categorizes it.
 However, to point out certain disabilities which have arisen in the way we 
use speech, in the course of our conversion from orality to literacy, is one thing. 
To focus on these as though they were central to the discussion, in the manner of a 
George Orwell, is something else and quite misleading. We can allow for the greater 
directness of the oral medium, and its historical importance, and its continuing 
presence in our culture, whether in formal poetics or informal converse. But it is a 
mistake to romanticize it, as though Homer represented the language of a lost Eden; 
a mistake also to hail its apparent revival in the voices and images of the electronic 
media (as described by Marshall McLuhan) replacing what is described as linear 
communication.
 The fact is that conceptual syntax (which means alphabetic syntax) supports 
the social structures which sustain Western civilization in its present form. Without 
it, the lifestyle of modernity could not exist; without it there would be no physical 
science, no industrial revolution, no scientifi c medicine replacing the superstitions 
of the past, and I will add no literature or law as we know them, read them, use 
them.
 Quite apart from its specialized use in works of philosophy, of history, of 
science, this syntax has penetrated into the idiom of narrative fi ction—precisely that 
idiom which had been Homer’s peculiar province, the province of all speech as it had 
been preserved orally within the pre-alphabetic cultures. Here is a quotation from 
the two opening paragraphs of a famous novel, Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell To 
Arms:
In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a village that looked across 
the river and the plain to the mountains. In the bed of the river there were pebbles 
and boulders, dry and white in the sun, and the water was clear and swiftly moving 
and blue in the
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channels. Troops went by the house and down the road and the dust they raised 
powdered the leaves of the trees. The trunks of the trees too were dusty and the 
leaves fell early that year, and we saw troops marching along the road and the 
dust rising and leaves, stirred by the breeze, falling and the soldiers marching and 
afterward the road bare and white except for the leaves.
 The plain was rich with crops; there were many orchards of fruit trees and 
beyond the plain the mountains were brown and bare. There was fi ghting in the 
mountains and at night we could see the fl ashes from the artillery. In the dark it 
was like summer lightning, but the nights were cool and there was not the feeling 
of a storm coming?2
 Ernest Hemingway would not be considered a conceptual writer. His 
proven power lies in the direct simplicity of his images, the narrative force of his 
descriptions, the dynamism of his style. His style would seem to be preeminently 
in this way an oral one, and the present example is no exception. The paratactic 
“and” recurs eighteen times in this short excerpt. Parataxis has been rightly noted 
as basic to the style of orally preserved composition, basic that is to its narrative 
genius, as required by mnemonic rules. The conjunction “and” is used to connect 
a series of visually sensitive images, themselves linked together by the resonance 
of echo: house-house, river-river; trees-trees-trees; leaves-leaves-leaves; dust-
dust; marching-marching; plain-plain; mountains-mountains; night-night. The 
vocabulary, following oral rules, is economical and repetitive.
 And yet, the original oral dynamism has been modifi ed and muted. Language 
which might have described actions and events as such, as doings or happenings, 
has been translated into statements of “what is.” The syntax of the verb “to be” has 
become sovereign, joining together visions which for all their sharpness are etched 
in temporary immobility:
In the bed of the river there were pebbles and boulders . . . the water was clean and 
swiftly moving . .. the trunks of the trees were dusty . . . The plain
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was rich in crops . . . there were many orchards . . the mountains were brown . . . 
There was fi ghting . . . it was like summer lightning.
 Students of Greek (or Latin) drilled in prose composition (now a lost art) 
learn the habit of converting such expressions back into the dynamics of the ancient 
tongues, a dynamics orally inspired. Verbs of action or situation have to replace 
defi nitive descriptions, as in the following version:
Pebbles and boulders were lying scattered in the depth of the river . . . the water 
fl owed rapid and sparkling and showed the depth below . . . the trees as to their 
trunks were covered by dust . . . the plain indeed fl ourished bountifully with rich 
crops and many orchards, but behind appeared mountains shadowy and barren . . . 
and there soldiers were fi ghting with thrown spears which fl ashed in the dark like 
the bolts of Zeus.
 The Hemingway version favors a presentation of the scene as a series 
of “facts”; the Greek, as a series of episodes. Here is a confrontation between 
the genius of literate speech preserved visually in the alphabet, and oral speech 
preserved acoustically in the memory. Narrativization of experience was not an 
idiom or idiosyncrasy of ancient tongues (though it was often treated as such in 
the instruction I received sixty years ago). It is an essential ingredient of all speech 
preserved orally in all the tongues of the world.
 The Greek alphabet came and took this over and remolded it to give us a new 
universe of language and of the mind; a universe of principles and relationships and 
laws and sciences, and values and ideas and ideals. These now ride on top of our 
immediate sensory apparatus and on top of the orality in which this apparatus fi nds 
readiest expression. A visual architecture of language has been superimposed upon 
restless acoustic fl ow of sound. This has been the fruit of the literate revolution in 
the West, whether for good or for ill.3
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Notes
1David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, ed. and introduction by D. G. C. Macnabb (Cleveland: 
World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 47.
2Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York: Scribner, 1929 et seq.), p. 3.
3An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Third Axial Age Conference, held under 
international auspices, at Bad Homburg in West Germany between July 15 and 19, 1985.
